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Abstract 
In the German-speaking world, the memory of the Reformation has often been closely connected to 
the theory of German historical exceptionalism, the idea that Germany’s historical development took 
a ‘special path’ (Sonderweg) to modernity. Yet considering how much attention has been paid to the 
question of a German Sonderweg and the significance of Weimar as a turning point in the story, 
scholars have paid little attention to the ideology of exceptionalism in the Weimar Republic itself. This 
article contributes to the historiography of the Sonderweg debate by examining the complex ways in 
which the poet Hugo Ball (1886-1927) and the philosopher Ernst Bloch (1885-1977) traced a narrative 
of German exceptionalism back to the Reformation era. It argues that these writers appealed to the 
intellectual and political legacies of the Reformation in an attempt to explain the formative events of 
their own time: the First World War, and the Russian and German Revolutions. The divergent 
ideological conclusions they drew reveals much about the conflicted atmosphere of Weimar thought, 
in which German intellectuals struggled to bridge the gap between crisis and tradition. 
Key words: Sonderweg, Weimar thought, Reformation memory, Ernst Bloch, Hugo Ball, Thomas 
Münzer 
In the German-speaking world and beyond, the memory of the Reformation has often 
been closely connected to the theory of Germany’s historical exceptionalism. In the 
eighteenth century, with the German Enlightenment in full swing, thinkers such as 
Lessing and Herder saw the Reformation as the source of an independent, unified 
German culture. Both men saw Luther, in particular, as a German folk hero, whose 
translation of the Bible into German, Lessing argued, railed against the clerical 
orthodoxy that ‘it would be better if [it] were not read by the common man in his own 
language’. 1  Herder shared Lessing’s view of Luther as a champion of the people, 
describing him as a ‘great patriotic man’ and the ‘teacher of the German nation’. 
Through the power of Luther’s language, Herder claimed, a ‘popular literary public’ 
had emerged in Germany for the first time, and his radical ideas had ‘shaped the whole 
of enlightened Europe’. 2 Long before Germany was a unified polity, then, German-
speaking thinkers saw the Reformation as the positive source of German cultural unity, 
specificity, and influence in the world.  
                                                        
1 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 8: Philosophische und theologische Schriften II 
(Berlin/Weimar, Aufbau Verlag, 1968), in Johann Baptist Müller (ed.), Die Deutschen und Luther. Texte zur 
Geschichte und Wirkung (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1983), p. 39.  
2 Johann Gottfried Herder, Sämtliche Werke. Bd. 17, ed. Bernhard Suphan (Hildesheim: Olms, 1967), in Müller, 
1983, p. 40. 
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A hundred years later, in the decades after 1848, socialist thinkers sought to excavate 
a different history, one that accorded more readily with their own aims and objectives. 
Not Luther, but the radical theologian and leader of the German Peasants’ War Thomas 
Münzer was the hero of their tale. Nevertheless, they too saw in the Reformation the 
origins of a German exceptionalism, albeit one drawn now in more negative terms. In 
Der deutsche Bauernkrieg (1850), Friedrich Engels argued that the failure of the 1848 
revolution was characteristic of the peculiar ‘misery’ of German history. Engels argued 
that Luther’s coalition with the princes against a rebellious Münzer with his more 
radical social demands had inaugurated a tendency in German history towards 
conservative compromises with authority. 3 Like Engels, the communist theorist Karl 
Kautsky pictured Münzer as one of the ‘forerunners of modern socialism’, and sought 
to position the contemporary German labour movement as the heir to his suppressed 
legacy.4 
A century later again, and half the globe was fighting European fascism. Thinkers on 
both sides of the Atlantic were desperate to explain how a modern, democratic, 
technologically advanced society like Germany could have descended into such total 
barbarism. A discourse emerged of a German historical Sonderweg, or special path, 
according to which Germany’s path to modernity had been marked by the persistence 
of illiberal and authoritarian attitudes. For William Montgomery McGovern and 
others, the roots of this phenomenon were to be sought in the sixteenth century. 
Tracing an intellectual lineage ‘from Luther to Hitler’, McGovern and many others in 
the years after the Nazi rise to power saw in the Reformation the origins of fascist 
ideology.5 
These three vignettes trace an arc in which the narrative of German historical 
exceptionalism, as viewed through the lens of the Reformation legacy, moved from a 
positive vision to a more negative one. Broadly speaking, that is the shape the more 
general historiographical debate over the German Sonderweg took in the twentieth 
century. Whereas in the late nineteenth century, Germany’s exceptional stability and 
prosperity was seen to derive from its rule through ‘reform from above’—as opposed to 
British liberalism, French revolutionary republicanism, and Russian despotism—after 
the Second World War, this picture began to be seen in a very different light. In the 
post-war period, many historians, particularly those working outside Germany 
followed McGovern in seeing the rise of fascism as the inevitable result of long-term 
tendencies in Germany’s history.6  
Starting in the 1960s, this picture began to be reassessed. Although historians such as 
Helmuth Plessner, Fritz Fischer, and Hans-Ulrich Wehler no longer followed 
McGovern and his successors in tracing the roots of German exceptionalism back to 
the Reformation era, they nevertheless continued to see the origins of National 
Socialism in Germany’s ‘belated nationhood’, and in the country’s continued 
domination into the twentieth century by arch-conservative, anti-Semitic völkisch 
                                                        
3 Friedrich Engels, Der deutsche Bauernkrieg in Karl Marx – Friedrich Engels – Werke. Bd. 7 (Berlin: Dietz, 
1960) pp. 327-413; cf. The Peasant War in Germany, in Marx-Engels Collected Works, Vol. 10 (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1978), pp. 397-482. 
4 Karl Kautsky, Vorläufer des neueren Sozialismus (Berlin: Dietz, 1895). 
5 William M. McGovern, From Luther to Hitler: The History of Fascist-Nazi Political Philosophy (George G. 
Harrap & Co., 1941). 
6 See, for example, Lewis Namier, 1848: The Revolution of the Intellectuals, Raleigh Lectures on History (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1944); A.J.P. Taylor, The Course of German History (London: Hamilton, 1945) and The 
Origins of the Second World War (London: Hamilton, 1961); William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third 




elites.7 Thinkers such as Fritz Stern, and George Mosse augmented the Sonderweg 
thesis by claiming that these elites sabotaged the attempt to build democracy in the 
Weimar Republic, thus creating the context that most immediately facilitated the rise 
of German fascism.8 Although today the Sonderweg thesis has all but been discredited 
as an explanation for Nazism, some historians continue to find it relevant to 
understanding the pervasive sense of crisis that plagued the Weimar Republic, and 
eventually contributed to its collapse.9 
Considering how much attention has been paid to the question of German 
exceptionalism and the significance of Weimar as a turning point in the story, scholars 
have paid little attention to the ideology of exceptionalism in the Weimar Republic 
itself. Mosse’s influential analysis of the roots of Nazi ideology examined the Weimar 
context closely, but his emphasis was on how certain ideological continuities between 
Weimar and the Third Reich could be observed that constituted a Sonderweg, rather 
than on how the idea of a Sonderweg was perceived in the Weimar Republic itself.10 
Similarly, Stern’s examination of the conservative revolutionary movement in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries demonstrated how a ‘politics of cultural 
despair’ dominated the period, and asserted that such attitudes formed the ideological 
bedrock of Nazism.11 And although his work necessarily touches on the question of 
how thinkers such as Arthur Moeller van den Bruck imagined Germany as a ‘special’ 
historical case, the status of the Sonderweg idea in the Weimar Republic was also not 
Stern’s central concern.  
The decline in currency of the Sonderweg thesis has meant that there has been no 
detailed study of how German exceptionalism was perceived among Weimar 
thinkers.12 Yet this question is essential if we want to historicise a discourse of German 
                                                        
7 Cf. Helmuth Plessner, Die verspätete Nation. Über die politische Verführbarkeit bürgerlichen Geistes 
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1959); Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War, 1914-1918 (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 1967) (originally published in 1961 as Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegzielpolitik des 
kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914–1918); Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Band 3: Von der 
„Deutschen Doppelrevolution“ bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges. 1849–1914 (Beck: München 1995). 
8 Fritz Stern, The Politics Of Cultural Despair; A Study In The Rise Of The Germanic Ideology, (Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1961, 1963); George L. Mosse, The crisis of German ideology: intellectual origins of 
the Third Reich (New York: Schocken Books, 1964). 
9 For more on the Sonderweg debate, see: Sherri Berman, ‘Modernization in Historical Perspective: The Case of 
Imperial Germany’, World Politics Volume 53, Number 3, April 2001, pp. 431–462; David Blackbourn and Geoff 
Eley, The Peculiarities of German History: bourgeois society and politics in nineteenth-century Germany (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984), a revised and expanded translation of the same authors’ Mythen deutscher 
Geschichtsschreibung: Die gescheiterte bürgerliche Revolution von 1848 (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 1980); Helga 
Grebing, Der deutsche Sonderweg in Europa 1806-1945: Eine Kritik (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1986); Theodore 
S. Hamerow, ‘Guilt, Redemption and Writing German History,’ The American Historical Review, February 1983, 
pp. 88:53–72; Konrad Jarausch, ‘Illiberalism and Beyond: German History in Search of a Paradigm,’ Journal of 
Modern History, Volume 55, 1983, pp. 647–686; Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship Problems and Perspectives 
of Interpretation (London: Arnold Press, 2000); Jürgen, Kocka, ‘German History before Hitler: The Debate about 
the German “Sonderweg,”’ Journal of Contemporary History, 23(1), Jan 1988, pp. 3–16; Robert Moeller, ‘The 
Kaiserreich Recast?: Continuity and Change in Modern German Historiography,’ Journal of Social History, 1983–
1984, 17, pp. 655–684; Wolfgang Mommsen, ‘Review of Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung,’ Bulletin of the 
German Historical Institute, Vol. 4, 1980, pp. 19–26; Detlev Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik: Krisenjahre der 
Klassischen Moderne (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1987), translated into English as The Weimar 
Republic: the Crisis of Classical Modernity (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992); Helmut Walser Smith, ‘When the 
Sonderweg Debate Left Us,’ German Studies Review, May 2008, 31(2), pp. 225–240; Hans-Ulrich Wehler,, 
“‘Deutscher Sonderweg” oder allgemeine Probleme des westlichen Kapitalismus,’ Merkur, 5, 1981, pp. 478–487. 
9 Engels, 1978. 
10 Cf. Mosse, 1964. 
11 Cf. Stern, 1963. 
12 George Steinmetz treats it in his chapter ‘German Exceptionalism and the origins of Nazism: the career of a 
concept’ (in Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin (eds.), Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison 
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exceptionalism that was at the centre of thinking about European crisis for decades if 
not centuries. For it was in the Weimar Republic that the idea of German 
exceptionalism assumed the dimensions of a political prophecy. In the 1920s and 30s, 
the idea that Germany had a unique world-historical mission to fulfil against the 
interests of global—‘Jewish’ and ‘Bolshevik’—elites came to underpin the propaganda 
machine of the radical right. However, left-wing thinkers also appealed to the 
exceptionalism argument in order to explain what many increasingly saw as Germany’s 
inexorable descent into barbarism. One of the most prominent Marxist historians of 
the Weimar era, Eckhart Kehr, for instance, identified Germany’s specificity in the fact 
that it had traditionally been dominated by an atavistic elite.13 
Not all Weimar engagements with the idea of German exceptionalism were as clear-
cut as this right-left dichotomy of might suggest. Indeed, given what Peter E. Gordon 
and John P. McCormick have called the ‘unity and diversity’ of Weimar thought—a 
seemingly heightened level of ‘anxiety’ and internal contradiction that resulted from a 
pervasive sense of crisis—this is to be expected. 14  This article contributes to the 
historiography of the Sonderweg debate by examining the complex ways in which two 
Weimar writers, the poet Hugo Ball (1886-1927) and the philosopher Ernst Bloch 
(1885-1977), construed the theory of German exceptionalism.15 
Anticipating the arguments of many post-1945 writers, both Ball and Bloch took the 
Reformation as a starting point for philosophies of history capable of explaining what 
had led Germany into war in 1914, why revolution had failed there in 1918 where it had 
succeeded a year earlier in Russia, and what was next for Germany, Europe, and the 
world. While Bloch’s utopian vision was intended to be inclusive and universalist, the 
future Ball imagined was tinged with an elitist racial nationalism. Nevertheless, the 
logic of their arguments was essentially the same: for them Münzer, not Luther, was 
the prophet of a German world-historical mission yet to be fulfilled.  
The article begins by situating Ball’s and Bloch’s interventions in the context of political 
instability and intellectual and artistic fecundity in the early Weimar years, and 
analyzing the commonalities in their perspectives. The second section then goes on to 
explore some of the divergences between Bloch and Ball, while the third section 
attempts to explain these differences in the broader context of their thought and time. 
A conclusion opens out the discussion, asking what the analysis of Bloch and Ball 
reveals about both the discourse of German exceptionalism as well as the ‘contested 
legacy’ of Weimar thought. Gordon and McCormick have argued that Weimar thought 
was uniquely characterised by a tension between crisis and tradition, and indeed these 
thinkers’ invocation of Reformation memory is interpreted as an attempt to respond 
to crisis by appealing to tradition. However, as we will see, this intellectual move did 
                                                        
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 251-284), but given the scope of Steinmetz’s perspective, 
Weimar can only be briefly glossed. 
13 Eckart Kehr, Battleship Building and Party Politics in Germany, 1894-1901 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1973). 
14 Peter E. Gordon and John P. McCormick, ‘Introduction: Weimar Thought: Continuity and Crisis’ in Gordon and 
McCormick (eds.), Weimar Thought: A Contested Legacy (Oxford/New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013), 
1-14, p. 2, 4. 
15 Ernst Bloch, Thomas Münzer als Theologe der Revolution (München: Kurt Wolff Verlag, 1923); Hugo Ball, 
Critique of the German Intelligentsia, trans. Brian L. Harris (Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 37; Die Folgen 





not map neatly onto a left-right axis, an insight that can be seen to challenge a narrow 
association of German exceptionalism with reactionary thought.  
‘The German revolution is yet to take place’ 
The German state that existed between 1919 and 1933 is known as the Weimar 
Republic because the assembly that adopted its constitution met in Weimar from 
6 February to 11 August 1919.16 Yet the term was not used by contemporaries: in its 
first recorded use, in a speech delivered by Adolf Hitler in February 1929, the term 
‘Weimar Republic’ is shot through with a sense of bitterness that engulfed both right 
and left in these decades. The decision in early November 1918 by German military 
leaders to fight on in the First World War under impossible conditions triggered 
mutiny and revolt that quickly spread throughout the country. Soldiers’ and workers’ 
councils began to take control of cities and towns: in Munich, King Ludwig III was 
forced to abdicate, setting in motion a domino effect that would see all German 
monarchs toppled by the end of the year. In Berlin, Friedrich Ebert, leader of the SPD, 
which held the balance of power, convinced Maximilian I to abdicate and on 
9 November a Republic was declared outside the Reichstag. Across town, however, at 
Berlin City Palace, Karl Liebknecht, a leader of the radical Spartacus League, also 
declared a republic, but one that would be led by people’s councils based on the Soviet 
model. 
The double declaration traced a fault line within the German left on the question of 
war. When the Kaiser declared war in 1914, the majority of the SPD, led by Ebert, 
supported it, creating serious tension between interventionists and pacifists within the 
party. As the war dragged on and the death toll rose, the issue only became more 
divisive. In the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, which galvanised many within the 
party to take a more radical stance, Ebert expelled opponents of the war from the SPD, 
who formed an independent party.  
With revolts still raging in Berlin well into 1919, the majority SPD-led assembly had 
met in Weimar to draft a constitution that was intended to bring democracy and 
stability to war-torn Germany. The revolution ultimately failed, and though the 
constitution passed, only a fragile consensus was achieved. Throughout the 1920s and 
early 1930s, German fascist paramilitaries clashed increasingly frequently with far-left 
groups in the streets. The Weimar Republic was thus riven from the very start by 
tensions between left and right, though their ideological differences were often less 
clear than they appeared to be on the surface. The radical left felt betrayed by the SPD 
over the deaths of Luxemburg and Liebknecht, murdered by the far-right mercenary 
Freikorps at Ebert’s behest for fear their uprising would threaten the establishment of 
order. Meanwhile, on the right, the idea took root that nationalist forces would have 
won the war had the SPD government not capitulated. This stab-in-the-back-myth 
animated the increasingly violent nationalist discourse that grew up in the Weimar 
                                                        
16 For more on the history of the Weimar Republic, see Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: the Outsider as Insider (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2001); Detlev Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1992 [1987]); Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic (London/New York: Routledge, 2008 
[1988]); Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, Edward Dimenberg (eds.), The Weimar Republic Sourcebook (Berkeley/Los 
Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1995); Ruth Henig, The Weimar Republic, 1919-1933 (New 
York/London: Routledge, 2002); Colin Storer, A Short History of the Weimar Republic (London/New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 2013). 
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years, and the ill-feeling was only exacerbated by the enormous war reparations that 
Germany was required to pay as part of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. 
Yet against this background of what Detlev Peukert has called ‘political breakdown and 
social misery’, intense ‘avant-garde cultural achievement’ flourished. Weimar was a 
hotbed of new approaches to art and culture, many of which had explicitly political 
aims.17 Expressionists and Dadaists sought to extend their political influence in order 
to benefit the working class, but were in practice often alienated from left-wing political 
parties and movements. Theirs was an alternative politics, a politics that aimed to 
move the body and soul rather than the mind. As the posters that popped up all around 
Berlin in 1920 would put it: ‘Dada is political […] Dadaist man is the radical opponent 
of exploitation […] DADA is the voluntary destruction of the bourgeois world of 
ideas’.18 Philosophers were moved by many of the same impulses as artists. Among 
Weimar thinkers, a new interest arose in culture as a route to understanding history 
and human nature. Bloch was heavily influenced by these trends: both his early work 
Spirit of Utopia (1918) and later his Principle of Hope (1959) sought to understand the 
relationship between history and utopian desire by analyzing the utopian content of 
cultural products and artefacts.19 
Born within a few months of one another, Bloch and Ball belonged to a generation in 
revolt against what they saw as the decrepit social and political order that had led 
Germany into war. 20  Both pacifists, Bloch opposed the First World War from the 
beginning, and after a brief flirtation with the idea of serving, Ball changed his mind 
after visiting the front lines in 1914. Their pacifism put the pair squarely at odds not 
only with German conservatives and liberals—Bloch denounced his Professors Georg 
Simmel and Max Weber over their support for the war, while Ball broke with his 
teacher Max Reinhardt—but also with the leadership of the Social Democratic Party, 
which had abandoned its previously antimilitarist stance in support of the war effort. 
As conscientious objectors, the two men were forced into exile, and it was thus that 
they met in Switzerland in 1917.  
When Ball moved from Zürich to Bern in September that year, Bloch had already been 
there for several months. Bern was a hotbed of anti-war activity coalescing around the 
Freie Zeitung, the leading anti-Kaiser publication in German-speaking exile. The two 
men struck up a friendship, and engaged in an intense intellectual exchange: Bloch 
specifically recalls that the pair discussed Münzer extensively during the years 1917-
1918.21 Both he and Ball became prolific contributors to the paper, which supported 
                                                        
17 Peukert, 1992, xiii.  
18 Sarah Ganz Blythe & Edward D. Powers (eds.), Looking at Dada (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 
2006), p. 5. 
19 Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, Vol. 1, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1996), Spirit of Utopia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000). 
20 No comprehensive biography of Bloch exists in English. The fullest German account is still Peter Zudeick, Der 
Hintern des Teufels. Ernst Bloch, Leben und Werk (Elster: Moos, 1985). English readers without German will find 
much of introductory value in the ‘Translators’ Introduction’ to Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, Vol. 1, trans. 
Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), pp. xix-xxxiii. The situation 
with Ball is a little better. Philip Mann’s Hugo Ball: An Intellectual Biography (London: University of London 
Press, 1987), is the publication of a doctoral disseratation that is more than serviceable. German readers will find 
Wiebke-Marie Stock, Denkumsturz: Hugo Ball: eine intellektuelle Biographie (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2012) 
an acceptable alternative. Meanwhile, John Elderfield’s editor’s introduction to Hugo Ball, Flight Out of Time: A 
Dada Diary (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1996), pp. xiii-xlvi, contains a good overview. 




the Entente and Wilson’s Four Points while consistently denouncing German 
militarism, nationalism and the corrupt Prussian aristocracy. 
Although Bloch and Ball were united by their common opposition to war, their 
intellectual, spiritual, and political trajectories nevertheless differed in significant 
respects. Bloch, who had been born into an assimilated Jewish family, was a self-
declared atheist, though he deeply believed in both the philosophical significance of 
religious motifs and their power to move people to action. His first wife, Else von 
Stritsky, was a devout Protestant interested in mysticism, and she influenced him 
towards a positive view of Christianity. Ball meanwhile was raised in a deeply pious 
Catholic household, and although he initially turned away from religion, he was 
profoundly marked by his faith, to which he would return in the early 1920s. Though 
neither man was ever officially politically aligned, Bloch was drawn to Marxism early 
on, particularly after his friendship with Georg Lukács. Ball had more anarchistic 
leanings: he read Bakunin and Kropotkin, and sometimes criticised Marxist ideas. 
Despite these differences, however, two questions loomed equally large for Bloch and 
Ball in the early Weimar years: what had made Germany pursue war so enthusiastically 
in 1914, and why had the German November Revolution of 1918 failed where the 
Russians had succeeded a year earlier?22 They both sought answers by looking to the 
apparent specificities of Germany’s past. In his Critique of the German Intelligentsia, 
Ball claimed that the question of German ‘isolation’ had occupied him since 1914, and 
declared his aim to ‘trace the principles that have put the German character at odds 
with the rest of the world’.23 Ball believed it was necessary to ‘go back into the depths 
of the Middle Ages’ in order to understand Germany’s contemporary situation, namely 
to the history of the Reformation and its consequences.24  
The opening section of Bloch’s Münzer book makes it clear that his aim is to interpret 
Reformation history through the lens of contemporary events. ‘We want always to be 
with ourselves’, the passage begins, and continues: ‘So here too we are in no way 
looking backwards. Rather we intervene vitally ourselves. In the process so do the 
others also return, transformed, the dead rise again, their action wants to be realized 
once again with us’.25 For Bloch, the ‘observer’ of history is ‘active’, and the purpose of 
invoking Münzer was a consciously political one: ‘he and his and everything that is 
gone which deserves to be written down’, Bloch argues, ‘is there to oblige us, to inspire 
us to build ever more expansive support for that which is always intended for us’.26 
What was ‘always intended for us’ in Bloch’s eyes was, in a word, utopia, and he invokes 
the spirit of Münzer in its pursuit. 
By betraying the revolution that Münzer hoped to bring about through the peasants’ 
uprisings, Ball argued, Luther had ushered in a reformist tendency that had paralysed 
                                                        
22 Writing in the Critique, Ball argued that in November 1918 one could see ‘with the so-called revolution how 
social democracy, right down to the ranks of the unaffiliated, allows itself to be used as a police and security 
institution’. Meanwhile Bloch’s invective against the Social Democrats was copious in the pages of the Freie 
Zeitung. In 1919, reflecting on the outcome of the failed November Revolution, he described the parliamentary 
Social Democrats as a ‘dictatorship of the minority’, and claimed that the struggle for true freedom was a struggle 
‘against the corridors of Weimar’. Ernst Bloch, ‘Wie ist Sozialismus möglich?’ in Kampf nicht Krieg: Politische 
Schriften 1917-1919 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985), 563-569, p. 563. Originally published in Die Weißen 
Blätter in May 1919; Ernst Bloch, ‘Entfesselung der Pressefreiheit’ in Kampf nicht Krieg, 449-453, p. 451. 
23 Ball, 1993, p. 1. 
24 Ball, 1993, p. 17. 
25 Bloch, 1923, 13. 
26 Ibid. 
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Germany’s historical development as compared with other European states. ‘During 
Luther’s time the German bourgeoisie sided with feudalism’, he writes, ‘and that 
alliance has survived all European revolutions and is determined now to gag and 
suppress Europe’. 27  Whereas the ‘rebellious spirit of the rest of Europe moved in 
opposite directions to German institutions, away from that feudal ethos of rulership’, 
according to Ball, Luther had charted a course of secular, defensive autocracy that had 
resonated down the ages. 28 Ball claimed that the establishment’s wish to suppress 
German desires for revolution explained why Luther was portrayed as a national hero 
in German schoolbooks from which Münzer and the Peasants’ War were conspicuously 
absent. 
In Thomas Münzer als Theologe der Revolution, which appeared just two years after 
Ball’s Critique, Bloch would trace a similar narrative. For Bloch as for Ball, the path 
Germany took after the Reformation and Peasants’ War had been decisive. ‘How 
difficult it was for the German peasant and burgher to recover from the defeat of his 
great, singular uprising’, he writes. 29  In its aftermath, the ‘servility of the people, 
brutality of the lordly class became for long years his fate, while freedom became 
associated exclusively with the invisible, the fleeting, the singular, that without 
example’.30 Bloch’s account mirrors Ball’s insofar as Luther emerges from it as the 
‘lord’ of a peculiarly ‘German quietism’ who had quelled the ‘belligerent orientation’ 
associated with Münzer’s Christianity by making the idea of rebellion appear sinful.31 
Both men thus saw Münzer as the herald of a distinctly German historical path that 
had, however, not yet been taken. 
A ‘ploy’ had evolved of ‘always talking about the Reformation, but never about the 
revolution that gave the period its salient character’. 32  Ball argued that ‘Thomas 
Münzer stands at the beginning of a development that has not yet run its course’.33 His 
comments on the Peasants’ War would be echoed by Weimar poet and journalist Kurt 
Tucholsky a decade later. Writing in the aftermath of the November Revolution that 
had seen the reformist Social Democratic leadership order Freikorps mercenaries to 
put down rebelling socialists in Berlin—leading, among other things, to the execution 
of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg—Tucholsky argued that the ‘German 
Revolution’ was ‘yet to take place’.34 Tucholsky’s remarks remind us that this pattern 
of historical thinking, according to which November 1918 stood in a lineage of failed or 
betrayed revolutions that would be avenged, resonated down the years in the Weimar 
Republic. Bloch and Ball were among the first to make such a claim after 1918, and for 
them Münzer became the historical representative of the promised revolution. 
‘To mobilise the secret powers of the nation’ 
If both Bloch and Ball sought to trace the origins of German belligerence back to the 
course taken by Luther, significant differences between their perspectives emerge 
when we compare their divergent interpretations of Germany’s historical relationship 
                                                        
27 Ball, 1993, p. 21. 
28 Ball, 1993, p. 47. 
29 Bloch, 1969, p. 91. 
30 Bloch, 1969, pp. 91-92. 
31 Bloch, 1969, p. 175; p. 92. 
32 Ball, 1993, p. 34. 
33 Ball, 1993, p. 41. 
34 Kurt Tucholsky, alias Ignaz Wrobel, ‘November-Umsturz’, Die Schwarze Fahne, 1928, Nr. 44, in Tucholsky, ed. 




to Russia. Both men lamented the fact that revolution had succeeded in Russia where 
it had failed in Germany. In Geist der Utopie, Bloch regretted that the Germans had 
‘become so Prussian instead of turning towards our Russian selves’, and wrote that this 
was Germany’s ‘tragedy and…true humiliation.’35 Meanwhile Ball asked a year later in 
his Kritik, ‘Where in Germany was to be found that spirit of freedom that had racked 
the conscience of the Russian people with such birth pangs since 1825?’36 However, 
Bloch was clear that the spirit of freedom behind the Russian Revolution stemmed 
from Germany, albeit ‘from another Germany, not yet entered into history – Karl Marx, 
the socialism of science, German philosophy.’ 37  In Geist der Utopie, Russia and 
Germany, together with Judaism, form a trinity through which Bloch saw the 
messianic impulse of the age channelled:  
‘there is no doubt that through a thousand energies, through the age old lens of 
a new proclamation Judaism, together with German-ness, again has a final, 
gothic, baroque meaning, in order, united with Russia, this third recipient of 
abidance, of God-bearing power and messianism, - to prepare absolute time.’38 
Ball, meanwhile, admired Russia’s rise to greatness in spite of what he referred to 
‘Bolshevism and vengeful Jewish terrorism.’39 Ball’s anti-Semitism distinguished his 
interpretation of German exceptionalism sharply from that of Bloch, who, as a ‘racially 
conscious Jew’, ultimately broke with his former friend over the issue.40 
When in November 1918 Ball wrote an anti-Semitic piece in Die Freie Zeitung, Bloch 
was shocked and deeply critical.41  In his article, Ball lashed out against ‘anational 
Israelites’ and declared that Germany must disavow ‘the business makers and the 
opportunists’ in order to become ‘a great, truly purified nation’.42 Eight days later, in a 
letter to his patron Wilhelm Muehlon, Bloch said that he had written to Ball objecting 
to the ‘astonishing concluding sentence of [his] editorial’. 43  Although he had not 
previously believed Ball to be an anti-Semite (‘otherwise he could not be my friend’), 
Bloch claimed he had now told Ball his anti-Semitism was ‘scandalous, no matter how 
he means it’.44 When Bloch left the paper in December that year, Anson Rabinbach 
speculates that it was on account of this ‘not very pretty’ reason.45 Given their split, it 
is difficult not to read Bloch’s comment in the afterword to Thomas Münzer—that his 
book was the first biography of Münzer to appear since Engels’—as an oblique response 
to Ball, who claimed in his own book that Münzer had ‘had no successful biographer’.46 
                                                        
35 Ernst Bloch, Geist der Utopie. Erste Fassung (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985 [1923]), p. 295. Translation 
mine. The first edition of Bloch’s Geist der Utopie was published in 1918 by Duncker & Humblot; a second edition 
followed in 1923, on which the version included as volume 2 of Bloch’s Gesamtausgabe is based. A facsimile 
edition of the 1918 text is included as volume 16 of the Gesamtausgabe. That edition is cited here, as discrepancies 
exist between the texts. 
36 Ball, 1993, p. 13. 
37 Bloch, 1918, p. 298. 
38 Bloch, 1918, p. 332. 
39 Ball, 1993, p. 19. 
40 Ernst Bloch, Briefe I (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985), pp. 232-233. 
41 Cf. Volker Knüfermann “Hugo Ball und Ernst Bloch als Beiträger der “Freien Zeitung” Berne 1917-1919” in 
Hugo Ball Almanach 12 (1988), pp. 31-33. 
42 Cf. Anson Rabinbach, ‘The Inverted Nationalism of Hugo Ball’s Critique of the German Intelligentsia’, in Ball, 
1993, p. xxvi. 
43 Bloch, 1985, pp. 232-233. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Rabinbach, 1993, p. xxvii. 
46 Ernst Bloch, Thomas Münzer als Theologe der Revolution (Frankfurt am Main Suhrkamp, 1969), p. 230 (NB: 
this was an addition and did not appear in the first edition); Ball, 1993, p. 37; Die Folgen der Reformation. Zur 
Kritik der deutschen Intelligenz, ed. Hans Dieter Zimmermann (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2005). 
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Ball’s anti-Semitism is on conspicuous display in the Critique of the German 
Intelligentsia, though in early editions many of the most offensive passages were 
excised.47 However, as Rabinbach makes clear in his introduction to the un-sanitised 
reissue of the text, ‘Ball leaves no doubt that he believes the great intellectual betrayal 
of 1914 can be ultimately be traced back to the principles of the Old Testament 
venerated by Luther and that the Protestant conception of the state as an instrument 
of power is ultimately derived from Jewish theology’.48 On the very first page of the 
original edition, Ball speaks of a ‘conspiracy of Protestant and Jewish theology (since 
Luther) and a conspiracy of both with the Prussian powers (since Hegel) seeking to 
subjugate Europe and the world, and bent on the universal destruction of religion and 
morals’.49 He concludes that ‘this conspiracy is more firmly and deeply rooted than is 
commonly believed’ and resolves to ‘mobilize the secret powers of the nation’ against 
it.50  
Thus although Ball declares in the Critique that he is ‘demanding democracy’ in the 
aftermath of the war, and that ‘incorporating Germany into a league of European 
nations’ in this context was ‘an inescapable demand’, in the end neither Western 
liberalism nor Russian Bolshevism was in his view capable of ending the spiritual 
malaise of the German people.51 His vision of German particularism was shot through 
with the same kind of racist nationalism espoused by many among the very 
intelligentsia he set out to criticise. As Rabinbach has argued, Ball had himself 
assimilated a form of racist nationalism, even if in a ‘negative’ or ‘inverted’ form.52  
Bloch’s vision of German exceptionalism and of Münzer’s place in that narrative was 
somewhat different. To be sure, like Ball, at this time Bloch was a supporter of the 
Entente powers and not uncritical of Bolshevism, which he described in 1918 as a form 
of ‘red Tsarism’. Yet Rabinbach goes too far when he claims that Bloch saw 
communism as just another item on ‘the list of political disasters the war had 
produced’.53 For Bloch at that time, as for so many of his contemporaries, democracy 
and communism were not at odds with one another, in fact they were synonymous. 
Consequently, Bloch’s effort to excavate the memory of Münzer and the Peasants’ War 
cannot be properly understood outside the framework of his engagement with 
Marxism.  
For Bloch, the legacy of the Reformation was an alliance between Lutheranism and 
capitalism, and the power of the memory of the Peasants’ War lay in motivating class 
struggle and political revolution in the present. In the aftermath of the First World 
War, Bloch claimed that the ‘military and princely class’ to whom Luther had dedicated 
‘all the strength of his demonic nature and all the perversion of his paradoxical concept 
of freedom and faith’ had finally been demolished in Germany. By associating Münzer 
explicitly with the murdered socialist Karl Liebknecht, Bloch made the latter into a 
martyr of the German revolution. 
He went further still by drawing parallels between Münzer and Lenin, and arguing that 
Münzer anticipated the innermost spirit of the Russian revolution. In deeply prophetic 
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language, Bloch claims that those struggling for social justice in his own day were the 
heirs of Münzer’s political-theological crusade: 
‘Now the descendants of Münzer’s apprentice weavers and cloth-making boys 
stand fully grown and not to be banished from the revolutionary plan. Time 
marches upright under their weight, their mission; the last socially possible 
class, heir of the peasantry, the tangential power breaking out into the infinite, 
is freed, the explosion of the principles of class and power, the final earthly 
revolution, is being born’.54 
As we can see, Bloch was explicit about his ambition to mobilise Münzer’s memory in 
the interest of advocating proletarian revolution, a ‘universal’ revolution whose 
intellectual roots he identified as specifically German, even if he saw the main locus of 
that prospect now in Russia. 
As Wayne Hudson has argued, ‘Thomas Münzer showed that Bloch’s unorthodox 
sympathies could lead to original orientations in Marxism […] and an anticipation of a 
possible Marxist inheritance of the political theology and subject-laden Christianity of 
the heretical sects’.55 The originality of Bloch’s perspective on Münzer can be seen 
partly in the fact that, although he engages with the contribution of earlier materialist 
historians such as Engels and Kautsky, his own intervention went decisively beyond 
these accounts. Both Engels’ and Kautsky’s focus on the class struggle dimension of the 
Reformation period saw them pit Luther and Münzer against one another as 
representatives of a nascent bourgeoisie and disenfranchised rural proletariat 
respectively. The rigid atheism of their perspective, meanwhile, meant that they 
broadly eschewed explanations of Reformation history that foregrounded either 
theology or popular belief as a motive force. Bloch, on the other hand, was keenly aware 
of the power of religious faith and discourse to motivate people to action. For him, 
Münzer was a prophet of a revolution that would be simultaneously social and 
spiritual. 
As the next section will argue, Ball also saw Münzer as the harbinger of Germany’s 
spiritual renewal, if in terms quite different from Bloch. Meanwhile, however, though 
Ball could not be straightforwardly called a socialist—he never mentions Engels except 
in the context of his critique of Marxism—structurally his account of the Reformation 
tacks at least as closely to the Engelsian line as does Bloch’s. In Ball’s account the 
reformer Luther is cast squarely in the role of the villain of German history, while the 
revolutionary Münzer is the messiah of a German fate that had hitherto been 
suppressed. From Ball’s perspective, the legacies of Münzer and Luther come to stand 
for a ‘new good and a new evil’, as he puts it in his curious inversion of the Nietzschean 
dictum. 
‘He who speaks in tongues improves himself, but he who 
prophesies improves the congregation’  
If both Bloch and Ball saw Münzer as the herald of a new, spiritualised politics, the 
reactionary tendency that Ball traced back to Luther had a heavily confessional flavor. 
According to Ball, Luther’s reforms had quashed the ‘enthusiasm’ of Münzer’s social 
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movement, which he believed was powered by Catholic mysticism.56 Moreover, given 
that, since Luther’s time, the educated intelligentsia in Germany had been 
predominantly Protestant, Ball claimed it had tried to suppress the fact that ‘it was 
Luther who kept Germany from taking the lead in liberal civilization’. 57  Luther, 
Protestantism and Judaism, illiberalism and rationalism were thus allied for Ball 
against Catholicism, intuition, universal love and freedom. 
Unlike for Ball, the distinction between progress and reaction did not map onto 
confessional differences for Bloch. If, as Bloch saw it, in the Lutheran tradition freedom 
‘disappeared into the lonely soul’, it fared no better under Catholicism, where it was 
absorbed into the ‘dualistic consolations of the…hereafter, so that the unconditioned 
should remain always only in the mind and heaven always only in the afterlife’. In his 
Atheism in Christianity, Bloch would claim that ‘the best thing about religion is that it 
makes for heretics’, and it was the repression of Münzer’s heresy by Luther’s orthodoxy 
that Bloch saw as definitive of the German trajectory.58 
When Ball published his Critique of the German Intelligentsia in 1919, his (re-
)conversion to Catholicism was yet to take place, but the wheels were clearly already in 
motion: the book calls for a ‘new international organization of the religious 
intelligentsia’, on whose corruption by Protestantism he blamed the decadence that 
had led to war.59 Ball’s claim in the book that responsibility for war lay not only with 
‘the governments of the central European powers’, but must be extended to include 
‘the ideology of the classes and castes that have supported these governments and 
made them possible’ evinces an increasing sense of political apathy.60 In Ball’s eyes, 
the scale of political change that would be required to atone for the violence and 
prevent a recurrence appeared so great as to be insurmountable. Ball’s invocation of 
Münzer in the foreword to the Critique is accompanied by a dedication to the leaders 
of a ‘moral revolution’, revealing a far stronger emphasis on the spiritual over the 
political dimension of renewal. 
Ball opposed Marxism as the ‘Jewish’ ideology of the German intelligentsia, and 
associated it with a ‘mentality of the masses’ which he believed was ‘the sum of 
aimlessness, restlessness, of despair and faint courage, of opportunism and indolence, 
of masked sentimentality and inflated arrogance’; He pitied any country ‘where that 
mentality outstrips intelligence […], where that mentality alone is in power and regards 
itself as intellect’.61 Thus although Ball despised the institutions of dynastic feudalism, 
which he argued had been ‘strengthened’ by Luther, he also associated the 
‘unpropertied class, the proletariat’, who was ‘trying to rise up again and spread from 
Berlin’ with the ‘same universal state of the Middle Ages’ he wanted to overcome.62 In 
order to do so, Ball argued, a new ‘hierarchical structure of thinkers able and strong 
enough to supplant the medieval spiritual hierarchy’ was needed, a society of ‘invisible 
gradations’ led by ‘an elite group of exemplary individuals’.63  
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Seth Taylor has described the political-intellectual current that dominated the pre-
Weimar era in which Ball and Bloch had been socialised and educated as a form of ‘left-
wing Nietzscheanism’.64 Yet it is in his elitism that Ball’s Nietzschean philosophical 
beginnings are most conspicuously on display in the Critique. Even if Ball ostensibly 
wanted to move beyond Nietzsche with his claim that the ‘Overman must yield to the 
Compassionate Man’, the trace of his influence remains in Ball’s suspicion of and 
contempt for ‘the herd’.65 Meanwhile, although Bloch’s early work also bears the trace 
of a Nietzschean influence, it is a Nietzsche read through the lens of his messianic 
Marxism. In the Münzer book he argues that there was ‘never a revolution that did not 
stamp out slave morality in order to destroy its protector and product: master 
morality’. 66  Here Bloch subverts Nietzsche’s association of Christianity with ‘slave 
morality’ by pitting Münzer against Luther as the symbol of its combative Aufhebung.  
Whereas Bloch associated Münzer with collectivist political ambitions, Ball was more 
interested in inspiring revolution in the individual. It was Ball’s blend of Christian 
mysticism with the anarchist thought of figures like Bakunin and Max Stirner that 
prompted Bloch to describe him as a ‘Christian Bakuninist’.67 Stefan-Sebastian Maftei 
has argued that under Nietzsche’s influence, Ball’s anarchism took shape as a cultural 
utopia, which, although it constantly exhibited social and political aspirations towards 
emancipation and revolution, in fact never sought to relate these goals to concrete 
political actions. 68  Ball had always felt himself riven by a conflict between his 
‘aesthetic’ and ‘political’ halves, and his politics arguably found their ultimate and most 
progressive expression in his art.  
In sound poems such as Karawanne, published in the tumultuous year of 1917, he 
sought to abandon the language of signs in search of an Adamic language of innocence, 
resurrecting a speech beyond war and catastrophe. Through sound poetry, Ball 
rediscovered the tradition of speaking in tongues, a kind of language that could be 
intuitively understood beyond a merely rational meaning. At the first Dada meeting in 
November 1916, Ball professed to be seeking a language freed from the constraints of 
communal rules. ‘I don't want words that other people have invented. All the words are 
other people's inventions.’69 Ball’s turn towards linguistic irrationalism was inspired 
not only by his search for an authentic spirituality and creativity, but also by his 
reception of Nietzsche, who had argued that all linguistic meaning is humanly defined 
rather than representing an external truth. Yet if the practice of speaking in tongues 
created a mystical sense of community among early Christians and Gnostics, it 
nevertheless precludes communication, and thus has a strongly individualistic 
dimension, a facet that also accords with Ball’s Nietzsche interpretation.  
Bloch, too, was sensitive to the inadequacy of conventional language to express our 
innermost desires and our experience of crisis. In these contexts, he argued, the 
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‘simplest word is already too much, the most sublime word too little’.70 Nevertheless, 
unlike Ball, Bloch held fast to the need for communicability in order to achieve real 
change. Paraphrasing 1 Corinthians 14:4, in Spirit of Utopia Bloch wrote that ‘Certainly 
he who speaks in tongues improves himself, but he who prophesies improves the 
congregation’.71 That is not to say that Bloch simply put the needs of the collective 
above those of the individual. It was equally important for him that ‘the self that 
improves itself not be lost in the world’; in other words, that individual autonomy be 
realised in and through, rather than at the expense of, collective action.72 The point 
was rather that without the ability to communicate rationally, social and political 
change could not be achieved. 
The worldly import of Münzer’s teachings was especially important for Bloch, who as 
we have seen interpreted the former’s revolutionary mysticism as a kind of Marxist 
messianism ante rem. Bloch equated Münzer’s ‘work on the world’ with ‘the 
‘renunciation’ of the ‘more comfortable, more tolerant peace’ represented by a merely 
‘individual salvation’, which comes ‘before at least the external path to the right life 
stands open to all brothers’.73 Meanwhile, although Ball explicitly rejects Judaism, 
Protestantism, and indeed Catholicism at various points throughout the Critique, he 
nevertheless sees in Münzer’s mysticism the chance to ‘establish the superiority’ of a 
non-specific form of ‘religious thinking over secular modes of thought’.74 Ball believed 
that the strength of the Catholic mystics lay in the fact they had ‘secularised the 
transcendence of the Church in order to turn it toward life […] interceding for the 
poorest and most humble among the people’.75 Yet for him, the value of mysticism lay 
not in its ability to provide spiritual sustenance for the political struggle of the masses, 
as it did for Bloch, but rather in the power it could offer a new ‘intellectual-spiritual 
elite’.76 Whereas for Bloch, Münzer was the prophet of a universal political revolution, 
ultimately, as Ball wrote in a letter to his sister in 1915, his politics increasingly 
concerned ‘only the spiritual,’ and as such the revolution Münzer prophesied for him 
was fated to remain a merely moral one.77 The fact remains, however, that both Ball 
and Bloch imagined revolutionary change emanating from Germany in the figure of 
Münzer, and both of them saw Germany spiritually ‘backward’ in Luther’s wake. 
Conclusion 
Attempts to historicise the discourse of German exceptionalism have sometimes 
sketched a narrative according to which idea has more positive associations early on, 
and only later, particularly with the rise of fascism and afterwards, acquires negative 
connotations. George Steinmetz has argued in this vein that the idea of German 
exceptionalism comprises ‘a positive strand, which praises Germany’s differentiation 
from the West, and a critical strand that codes this deviation as backwardness’.78 
Steinmetz locates the origins of a positive exceptionalist narrative in the Reformation 
period itself, which then crystallised in the late nineteenth century and into the Weimar 
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era. Meanwhile, although Steinmetz sees the critical discourse as originating in 
antiquity with Tacitus’ Germania, for him, the more radical version of this view, 
according to which Germany was ‘dominated by an atavistic elite and an outdated 
culture’ emerged only during the First World War. Although he doesn’t mention Ball 
in this context, Steinmetz cites Bloch as one of the representatives of this view in the 
1930s, particularly in his book Heritage of Our Times (1935).79 
A comparison of Ball’s and Bloch’s accounts of exceptionalism during the Weimar 
years demonstrates just how ideologically conflicted accounts of German 
exceptionalism were during this period, such that even Steinmetz’s nuanced account 
does not fully capture the texture of their interventions. Ball declared himself on the 
side of peace and liberalism, yet argued that a German national revival, heavily 
overtoned with anti-Semitism, was the only way to arrest universal spiritual and 
cultural decline. And though Bloch rejected the racial nationalism inherent in Ball’s 
vision, his own claim that the seeds of a (Marxist) world revolution had been sown in 
Germany is structurally consonant with Ball’s claim that Germany had some sort of 
unique, mystical, world-historical mission to fulfil.  
Ultimately, by following the prophet Münzer down a rabbit hole of individualistic, 
anarchistic glossolalianism, Ball’s politics were visibly more elitist and exclusive than 
Bloch’s. Nevertheless, their closeness at so many points gives the lie to any idea that 
German exceptionalism can be neatly parsed into politically radical and reactionary 
strands. Paradoxically, in the anxiety- and conflict-ridden early years of Weimar 
Germany, it is precisely the idea of exceptionalism’s inscrutability that seems to make 
most sense. 
And what of the role of the Reformation in all this? Why did both Ball and Bloch seek 
to hang their arguments on the hook of the sixteenth century? The obvious answer, it 
seems to me, is that there was already a tradition of doing so that dated back at least to 
the German Enlightenment. As simple as this response may seem, however, it makes 
visible an important characteristic of Weimar thought that has very often been 
overlooked. Gordon and McCormick’s argument that ‘crisis’ was the ‘one theme that 
seems to appear across the entire range of Weimar intellectual history’ presents us with 
a commonplace vision of the intellectual culture of the era. 80 It recalls Peukert’s 
analysis cited earlier, of our schizoid perception of Weimar as on the one hand 
dominated by deep anxieties, and on the other a cradle of much of the most fruitful 
modern art and thought. Yet as Gordon and McCormick also remind us, crisis ‘is only 
intelligible given the strength of preceding and persistent tradition’, and indeed in 
many ways Weimar thought remained deeply connected to the ideologies, beliefs, and 
values of the Kaiserreich. 81 Indeed, among those who still find in the Sonderweg thesis 
a convincing explanation for the trials of Weimar point to the centrality of this vexed 
relationship between tradition and crisis. Continuities with the ideologies and attitudes 
of the Kaiserreich, they argue, stood in direct conflict with the Republic’s democratic 
and progressive aspirations.82 
Ball’s and Bloch’s interpretations of the Reformation offer exemplary illustrations of 
this contradiction. Both attempted to explain their contemporary experience of crisis 
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by appealing to what Walter Benjamin would later call a ‘tradition of the oppressed’—
in this case, an oppressed desire for revolution that both believed dated back to 
Münzer’s defeat.83 To be sure, for Ball, who clearly bought into the idea prevalent 
among German conservatives, that Germany had been betrayed in the First World 
War, it was the ‘true’ German nation itself that had been oppressed by a cabal of sinister 
anti-German forces. For Bloch, it was the desire for a socialist revolution that had been 
stifled, which despite what he saw as its distinctly German roots was meant to benefit 
the whole of humankind. Just as they identified a neglected tradition in German 
history, both Bloch and Ball sought a tradition with which to legitimate both their 
interpretations of contemporary crises, and their strategies for a different future. They 
found one readymade that dated back to Lessing, Herder, Engels, Kautsky, and others. 
Situating themselves in this intellectual lineage allowed Ball and Bloch to invoke 
Reformation memory in their attempts to reconcile the most characteristic tension in 
Weimar thought: that between crisis and tradition. 
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